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Wagenmakers et al. (2017) addressed the illogic use of p-values in inferential statistics in 
Psychological Science under Scrutiny. While historical criticisms (e.g., Harshbarger, 1977, 
onwards) mostly deal with the illogical nature of null hypothesis significance testing 
(NHST)—a mishmash of Fisher’s, Neyman-Pearson’s, and Bayes’s ideas (e.g., Gigerenzer, 
2004; Perezgonzalez, 2015a)—Wagenmakers et al. generalize such argumentation to the p-
value itself, the statistic used by frequentists when testing research data.  
Wagenmakers et al. assert that Fisher’s disjunction upon obtaining a significant result—i.e., 
either a rare event occurred or H0 is not true (Fisher, 1959)—is a logically consistent modus 
tollens (also Sober, 2008): If P, then Q; not Q; consequently not P, which the authors parsed 
as: If H0, then not y; y; consequently not H0.  
The authors defined ‘y’ as “the observed data . . . [summarized by] the p-value” (p. 126). 
Therefore, their first premise proposes that, if H0 is true, the observed p-values cannot occur 
(also Cohen, 1994; Beck-Bornholdt and Dubben, 1996), which seems incongruent. Indeed, 
the first premise of a correct modus tollens states a general rule—H0 implies ‘not y’—while 
the second premise states a specific test to such rule—‘this y’ has been observed. I guess the 
authors meant for ‘y’ to represent ‘significant data’ as a general category in the first premise 
and as a specific realization in the second. Thus, following Pollard and Richardson (1987), a 
congruent modus tollens would be: 
If H0, then not p < sig; p < sig (observed); consequently not H0 (0) 
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Wagenmakers et al.’s main argument is that a correct modus tollens is rendered inconsistent 
when made probabilistic, as: If H0, then p < sig very unlikely; p < sig; consequently H0 very 
unlikely (also Pollard and Richardson, 1987; Cohen, 1994; Falk, 1998). There are, however, 
three problems with the argument.  
The first problem is stylistic. The first premise states that a significant result—which already 
implies an unlikely or improbable event under H0—is unlikely: a redundant probability 
statement. Their probabilistic syllogism can thus be simplified as:     
If H0, then p < sig (i.e., very unlikely p’s); p < sig; consequently H0 very unlikely (1) 
 
Correction (1) makes now quite evident the second problem. The second premise simply 
affirms that an unlikely result just happened (also Cortina and Dunlap, 1997), which is 
neither precluded by the first premise (no contrapositive ensues; Adams, 1988) nor formally 
conducive to a logical conclusion under modus tollens (Evans, 1982). Such realization of an 
unlikely event is obvious in the examples given: Tracy is a US congresswoman, Francis is the 
Pope, and John made money at the casino, each despite the odds against them, none denying 
the consequent (also Cohen, 1994; Beck-Bornholdt and Dubben, 1996; Cortina and Dunlap, 
1997; Krämer and Gigerenzer, 2005; Rouder et al., 2016). A plausible correction, following 
Harshbarger (1977) and Falk (1998), would state:  
If H0, then not p < sig; p < sig; consequently probably not H0 (2) 
 
Correction (2) brings to light the third and most important problem. Modus tollens is in the 
form: If P, then Q; not Q; consequently not P. Therefore, whenever the consequent (Q) gets 
denied in the second premise, it leads to denying the antecedent (P) in the conclusion. The 
same operation ought to prevail with probabilistic premises (e.g., Oaksford and Chater, 2001, 
2009; Evans, Thompson and Over, 2015), whereby a probable Qp gets denied in the second 
premise without its probability warranting transposition onto a non-probabilistic antecedent 
P.  
For example, if red cars (P) get stolen 95% of the time (Q≥.95) and we learn of a Lamborghini 
with little chance of so disappearing (not Q≥.95), it is logical to conclude that the Lamborghini 
is not red (not P). Equally, if John submits to Nature (Q) whenever his subjective probability 
of getting published soars above 20% (P>.2), yet he will not submit his latest article (not Q), it 
is logical to conclude that he probably expects no publication (not P>.2). Furthermore, if the 
probability of people playing lotto increases (Qy) whenever winning is more probable (e.g., a 
‘Must Be Won’ jackpot; Px), yet ticket sales are rather flat (not Qy), it is logical to conclude 
that there is probably no ‘Must Be Won’ jackpot on the cards (not Px).  
We can thus envisage P or Q, or both, as probable without either warranting inter-
transposition of their probabilities, which brings us back to a valid modus tollens (0), contrary 
to what Wagenmakers et al.’s (and historical) arguments claim. Said otherwise, while 
Bayesian statistics allow for the antecedent to be probable (Pp), Fisher’s and Neyman-
Pearson’s tests assume true antecedents (P); therefore, a probabilistic conclusion does not 
hold with frequentist tests (Mayo, 2017).  
It ought to be noted that the p-value is a statistic descriptive of the probability of the data 
under H0 [p(D|H0)] (Perezgonzalez, 2015b). The reductio ad absurdum argument may be 
informed by, but is not dependent on, such p-value, the reductio being determined 
exclusively by the chosen level of significance, whether conventional or not, and whether 
established a priori (α) or not. For “it is open to the experimenter to be more or less exacting 
in respect of the smallness of the probability he would require before he would be willing to 
admit that his observations have demonstrated a positive result. It is obvious that an 
experiment would be useless of which no possible result would satisfy him” (Fisher, 1960, 
p.13).   
Therefore, the technology of frequentist testing holds their modus tollens logically. While 
historical critiques are unclear on whether they are (wrongly) criticizing frequentist tests or 
(correctly) criticizing the NHST mishmash, Wagenmakers et al.’s criticism of the p-value is 
faulty in that they allow for a probability transposition warranted neither by modus tollens nor 
by the technical apparatus of Fisher’s and Neyman-Pearson’s tests.  
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